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The Elements of Crime
A crime is composed of two elements:
(I).
A particular physical condition.
(2). A particular mental condition.'
The former is a material or subjective condition, and is
called the criminal act; the latter is a formal or subjective
condition, and is called the criminal intent.
Maxim
The necessity for the existence of these two elements is
frequently indicated by the maxim. Actus non facit reum,
nisi mens sit rea. This maxim has been said to be "the funIt has been famdamental maxim of the criminal law. ' 2
'C. Kenny, Crim. L. (2nd ed.), 36. "All crimes have their conception in a corrupt intent and their consummation and issuing in
some particular fact." Bacon, Max. Reg. 15. "The act and intent
must concur to constitute the crime." Fowler v. Padget, 7 T. T.
A., 514.
2Brown v. S., 23 Del. 159, 25 L. R. A. N. S. 66; Stephen,
list. Crim. L., vol. 2, p. 95; Salmona, Law of Torts, 12.
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iliar to English lawyers for nearly eight hundred years,3
and has been widely used in criminal trials for several
centuries. 4
The original source of this maxim is the sermons of Saint
Augustine, who, speaking of perjury, says, "'Reum linguam
non facit nisi mens rea." 5
It later appears in the Leges
Henrici as "Reum non facit nisi mens rea," and it is probable that the author of the Leges took it from some intermediate book in which the linguam had disappeared.,
Cooke, who was familiar with the Red Book of the Exchequer which contains the Leges Henrici, in the course of
his account of the Statute of Treasons7 states the maxim,
"Et actus non facit reum nisi mens rea sit, s and Coke is
usually cited as the authority for the maxim. 9
In criticism of this maxim it has been said that, like most
Latin maxims, it is too short and antithetical to be of much
practical value; that it is not only likely to mislead but actually misleading;1° that it looks more instructive than it really
1
is, and suggests fallacies which it does not precisely state.
In reply to this criticism it may be said that one should
not expect to find in a Latin maxim "the complete exposition of a complex legal theory," and that the wide use of
the maxim has at any rate had the good result of familiariz2
ing lawyers with the principle embodied in it.3
3Kenny, Crim. L. 37.
4Stroud, Mens Rea, p. 19.
5
Sermones, No. 180, c. 2; Pollock and Maitland, Hist. Eng. L.
vol. 2, p. 474; 30 Harvard L. Rev. 539. In Reg. v. Tolson, 23 Q.
B. D. 185, Stephen, J., said that he had endeavored to find its origin but had not succeeded.
6Leg. Hen. 5, See. 28; Pollock and Maitland, vol. 2, p. 474.
725 Edw. III, c. 2.
sThird Inst. 6.
9Stephen, Hist. Crim. L., vol. 2, p. 94.
'OReg. v. Tolson, 23 Q. B. D. 185, per Stephen, J.
"Stephen, Hist. Crim. L., vol. 2, p. 94.

2Stroud, Mens Rea., p. 14.
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Theory
The theory underlying the requirement expressed by the
maxim is that before punishing for a crime the law must be
satisfied of two things:
(I) That an act has been done which by reason of its
harmful results or tendencies should be repressed by criminal punishment. The aim of the law is not to punish sins
but to prevent certain external results.
(2) That the mental attitude of the actor toward the
act was such as to render punishment effective as a deterrent
for the future. The law accomplishes its aim primarily
through deterrence, and in order to deter there must be a
state of mind upon which the threats of punishment can
exert an influence.
The Criminal Act
The first element of a crime is called the criminal act.
The term act is one of ambiguous import, and is frequently
used by judges and writers without much thought of any
3
possible ambiguity.'
Acts are sometimes classified as internal and external.
The former are acts of the mind; the latter are acts of the
body.' 4 The term criminal act is used, however, to describe
a physical condition and is therefore restricted to external
acts.!

'

Necessity For an Act
The necessity for an act (i. e. an external act) as an
essential condition of criminality seems to be quite universal. It exists in various systems of law,16 and "'must evi"'Cook, 8 Yale, L. J., 647.
l4Holland, Jurisprudence, p.

100; Salmond, Jurisprudence,

p.

323.
15"In a technical legal definition of acts we do not need to make
room for internal acts." Terry, Principles of Anglo-American Law,
p. 65.
'OUlpian says, "Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur." Dig. 48,
19, IS. Montesqieu says, "Les lois ne se chargent de punir que les
actions exterieures."
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dently be recognized unless where the worst form of tyranny
prevails."17
It seems always to have been recognized in England and
the United States. "The imagination of the mind to do
wrong without an act done is not punishable in our law," is
the pronouncement of an English court in an early case,
and a comparatively recent American writer declares, "Intent to commit a crime is not itself criminal." "
It is true that in a few isolated cases in the Year Book of
the fourteenth century the judges, adopting the maxim,
"Voluntas reputabitur pro facto," took the will for the deed
and punished the intent only, tho the act was not accomplished. 19 But tho both Staunforde and Hale treat this
doctrine as seriously held during the reign of Edward III,
it seems that its adoption was but a momentary aberration
and that the law started from the other extreme, "Factum
reputabitur voluntate.20
The Divine Law
In requiring an act as a condition of criminal liability the
law differs from the Divine Law. The Decalogue commands, "Thou shalt not covet,',' as well as, "'Thou shalt not
steal;" and in the most famous of all sermons we are informed, "Whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after
her hath committed adultery with her already in his
heart." "
27Broom, Legal Maxims, 311.
IsHalles v. Petit, Plow. 259; Holmes, The Common Law, p. 65.
19Pollock and Maitland, Hist. Eng. L., vol. 2, p. 476; Holdsworth, Hist. Eng. L., vol. 3, p. 297. This was a dangerous doctrine, but tempting perhaps when there was no legislation against
attempts to commit crimes, and when owing to the disuse of appeals the criminal law had become too lenient in cases of murderous assaults which did not cause death.
2OPollock and MWaitland, vol. 2, p. 477.
21"The men of old time had forbidden adultery; the new moral
legislator forbid lust." Stephen, Science of Ethics, p. 148.
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Ethics
It also differs from the principles of ethics or moral
philosophy, by which the mental element is sufficient to constitute guilt. Morality is internal. The moral law has to
be expressed in the form "Be this," and not in the form,
"Do this." 22 When therefore Garrick declared that whenever he acted Richard III he felt like a murderer, Dr. Johnson as a moral philosopher.retorted, "Then you ought to be
hanged whenever you act it."
Common Law Crimes
The requirement of an act as an essential condition of
criminal liability is applicable to both common law and
statutory crimes. "The law will not take notice of an intent without an act''2 3 correctly states the rule of the com-

inon law.
It is sometimes stated that conspiracy is an exception to
this rule, but this is incorrect. Conspiracy is not the mere
concuri ence of the intentions of two or more persons, but
the announcement and acceptance of intentions. Bodily
movement by word or gesture is necessary to effect it.24
Statutory Crimes
The requirement is also applicable to statutory crimes.
Here also it is declared that "a person's intentions alone
25
violate no law."
In England Parliament is omnipotent, and its power to
define and punish crimes is absolute. It would seem there22Stephen, The Science of Ethics, p. 148. But no moral teacher
should tell 'men that it is just as bad to wish an evil thing as to
do it. Hamilton, Studies in Moral Science, p. 76.
23Dugdale v. Reg. 1 E & B. 435.
24
Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 25 Harvard Law. Rev. 399. The
spealing of words Is an act. Terry, Principles Anglo-American
Law, p. 65.
25P. v. Martin, 102 Cal. 558, 36 Pao. 952.
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fore that Parliament has the power to make a mere mental
condition criminal. This power, however, has apparently
never been exercised, even if it exists. An exception appears to exist in that form of treason called "compassing
the King's death." But the exception is only apparent, for
the statute makes it essential to conviction that some "overt
act" should have been committed toward accomplishing
the end contemplated.26
In the United States the power of the Legislatures of the
various states to define and punish crimes is limited by the
Federal and State Constitutions, and it has been stated that
".a criminal intent not connected with any overt act may not
be punished as a crime, and any statute purporting to do
so is unconstitutional ' ' 2 7 but the specific provision of the
Constitution which such a statute would violate is not indicated. Whatever the power of the Legislatures may be,
no instance has been discovered in which a mental condition without an act has been made criminal by statute.
The Character of the Act
The criminal act may be either positive or negativean act of commission or an act of omission. 28 Acts of omission, being purely negative, can only be described by describing the acts of commission which are omitted; and by
some authorities the term act is used in a narrow sense to
include only positive acts, and is then opposed to omissions
instead of including them.29 This restriction is inconvenient. Adopting the generic sense, acts can be described as
positive and negative, but if the term is restricted to acts
of commission, there is no name for the genus, and an
enumeration of the species is necessary. 30
2OKenny, Grim. L., p. 38.
2730 Yale Law J., 762.
2816 C. J. 83; Reg. v. Lowe, 4 Cox C. C. 449.
9
2 Markby, Elements of Law, sec. 215; Austin,
Lecture XIV.
3OSalmond, Jurisprudence, p.

323.

Jurisprudence,
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When it is said that the criminal act may be either positive or negative, it is not meant that every crime may consist of either a positive or a negative act. The perpetration of some crimes requires a positive act; the perpetration
of others requires a negative act; and some crimes may be
perpetrated by either positive or negative acts.
Negative Acts
The great majority of crimes require acts of commission. Although the number of crimes by omission has increased greatly in recent years, they are still comparatively
1
few in number.A
Omissions, no matter how reprehensible,
are usually not crimes because there is no technical legal
duty to do the thing omitted. Most of the duties which the
law imposes are negative duties, duties to abstain from acts
of commission.
The law does not require active benevolence between
man and man. It is left to one's conscience whether he
shall be a good Samaritan or not.3 2 "Thus not to remove
your neighbor's baby from the railroad track in front of
an onrushing train although it would cause you very little
trobble to do so, is no crime even if the child's life is lost
as a result of your neglect. You can let your mother-in-law
choke to death without sending for a doctor, or permit a
ruffian half your size to kill an old and helpless man, or allow your neighbor's house to bum down, he and his family
sleeping peacefully in it, while you play the pianola and
refuse to call up the fire department, and never have to
suffer for it-in this world." .3
It is chiefly by reason of its failure to impose affirmative
duties, and to make the failure to perform these duties
crimes, that the criminal law differs from morality; and it is
3

lOdger, Common Law of England, p. 106; Stroud, Mens Rea.
p. 155.
32Ames, Essays on Legal History, p. 451.
3STrain, The Prisoner at the Bar, p. 450.
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perhaps debatable whether inaction in the face of manifest
danger to another should not be made criminal.
It seems, however, that the law in strictly limiting affirmative duties, and consequently crimes of omission, has
adopted a prudent course. If every one were bound to act
when another was exposed to danger, the consequences resulting from officious and mistaken interference would probably be worse than those which .result from the operation
of the present law.
The practical difficulty in framing laws to impose affirmative duties to bp benevolent would also be very great.
The difficulty would be in drawing the line. A possible
working rule might be that one who fails to interfere to save
another from impending death or great bodily harm when
he might do so with little or no inconvenience to himself,
and death or great bodily harm follows as a consequence
34
of this inaction, shall be guilty of a crime.
Elements of an Act
Every act is made up of three distinct factors or constituent parts:
(1) Its origin in some bodily activity or passivity, of
the actor.
(2) Its circumstances.
35
(3) Its consequences.
For example, suppose A kills B by shooting him with
a pistol. The factors or constituent parts of the act are:
(I) its origin-a series of muscular contractions by which
A's arm is raised and his finger crooked; (2) its circumstances-the fact that A has a pistol in his hand, that it is
loaded, that B is in range and in the line of fire; (3) its
consequences-that the pistol is raised and pointed in B's
direction, that the trigger is pulled and the hammer falls,
that the powder explodes, that the bullet is expelled and
34

Ames, Essays on Legal History, p. 451.
Yale Law J., 325; Salmond, Jurisprudence, p. 325.

35
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goes through the air and strikes and penetrates B, that B's
body undergoes physical changes which produce death. A
similar analysis may be made of all acts for which a man
may be held criminally responsible.
By some writers the term act is confined to that part of
an act which we have described as its origin. According to
these writers the circumstances and consequences of an act
are not regarded as a part of it, but as wholly external to it.36
Under this theory the elements of a crime are: (I) the act;
(2) its circumstances; (3) its consequences; (4) the mental
element.Al
This view has not, however, been adopted in this article,
and the term act is here used as a convenient short hand
method of expression to describe not only the origin of the
act, but also its circumstances and consequences. For this
use there is abundant authority.As
The Consequences of an Act
All acts are in respect of their origins alone indifferent.
No bodily activity or passivity is itself criminal. 89 All the
muscular contractions of a man who shoots another with a
pistol, the motions of his arm and hand by which the pistol
is aimed and discharged, would be perfectly lawful if the
actor had no pistol in his hand or if no one stood in front
of it, or even, in some cases, if the pistol were not loaded.
Acts are made criminal because of their consequences,
and these consequences are determined by the circumThe consequences of an act because of which it
stances. 4"
aaAustin, Jurisprudence, p. 415; Markby, Elements of Law, see.
215; Holmes, The Common Law, p. 91.
37Cook, 26 Yale Law J., p. 647.
38
Salmond, Jurisprudence, p. 325. "This is a convenient form
of expression and as such we need not hesitate to us( it even in
legal discussions." Terry, Anglo-American Law, p. 86.
391Holmes, The Common Law, p. 34; Terry, Principles of AngloAmerican Law, see. 110, 334.
4OSalmond, Jurisprudence, p. 325.
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is made criminal may be either actual or anticipated, and
crimes may accordingly be divided into two classes:
Those in which an act is made criminal by reason
(I)
of the actual harm which in fact ensues from it.
(2) Those in which an act is made criminal by reason
of its mischievous tendencies, irrespective of the actual results.
Classes of Crimes
Criminal liability is frequently established by proof of
an act which is dangerous in its tendencies, even though no
harm in fact ensues. 41 For example, although a riot is defined to be "a tumultuous disturbance of the peace * * *
to the terror of the people," it is held that if the tendency
of an assembly is to inspire terror, it is not necessary to
2
show that any one was in fact terrorized.4
Crimes of which motive is an essential element usually
belong to this class. In these crimes an act which otherwise would not be criminal is made criminal because the
motive with which the act is done gives it a mischievous
tendency. The motive is the index of the probability of
43
certain future harms which the law seeks to prevent.
Criminal liability, sometimes depends upon the actual
consequences of an act. Thus, though one is negligent in
the use of fire arms, he is not criminally responsible if his
negligence results in no accomplished mischief. 4
Prohibition by Law
Bodily activity or passivity may be attended by an infinite variety of circumstances and an endless chain of consequences. Out of this array and chain the law selects some
and declares that bodily activity or passivity, or certain
41It has been said that criminal liability is usually so establish-

ed.

Salmond, Jurisprudence, p. 328.
v. Alexander, 7 Rich. (S. C.) 5.
4 Holmes, The Common Law, p. 65 et seq.
44Salmond, Jurisprudence, p. 328.
42S.
3
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forms of bodily activity or passivity, attended by these, is
criminal. It is the law which selects the bodily activities
and passivities and the circumstances and consequences with
which they must be attended to constitute crimes. "It is for
the law at its own good pleasure to select and define the
relevant and materials facts in each species of crime.45 The
circumstances and consequences so defined and selected are
the constituent parts of the criminal act. All others are irrelevant and without legal significance.
It follows from what has been said that an act in order
to be a crime must be selected and defined as such by the
law. No act, however morally reprehensible or economically injurious it may be, is a crime unless it is prohibited by
law.46

This rule is strictly construed in favor of the accused,
so that no matter how similar his act may have been to that
forbidden by law it is not a crime. Even the fact that the
actor believed that his act was so prohibited is not sufficient if the act done was not really so prohibited, and this
is true whether the actor's mistake was one of fact or one of
law. Thus an American soldier who joined the American
troops believing that they were British troops was held not
to be guilty of treason ;47 and a man who took wild bees
believing that they belonged to his neighbor was held not
to be guilty of larceny.48
Since an act to be a crime must be prohibited by law,
the question whether an act shall be a crime is a question for
the State through its law making agencies to determine, and
the question whether a certain act is a crime is a question of
law to be decided by reference to legal definitions and distinctions, and not a question of fact to be decided on analysis of acts.
45Salmond, Jurisprudence, p. 326.
4cC. v. Marshall, 11 Peck. (Mass.) 350; U. S. v. Ramsay, Fed.
Cas. No. 16, 115; Smith v. S. 12 Ohio State 466.
47Res. v. Mallin, 1 DalU. 33.
48Wallis v. Mease, 3 Binney 546.
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It is impossible to draw an exact and permanent line between acts which are criminal and acts which are not. The
general opinion of society, finding expression through the
common law or statutes, makes an act criminal or not according to the view which it takes of the proper means of
preserving order and promoting justice.
The reasons which influence the State to make acts
crimes vary with the country and the age. Acts which are
criminal in one jurisdiction may not be criminal in another;
and acts which are criminal at one period may not have
49
been criminal at another period in the same jurisdiction.
Methods of Definition
The law defines criminal acts in two different ways. In
some cases it gives an accurate and detailed description of
the act which is to constitute a crime. This is the method
used in defining most of the common law felonies and certain common law misdemeanors, and is the method generally used by the Legislature.
In other cases the law simply describes a certain consequence and characterizes as a crime' any act of which this
result is an actual or anticipated consequence. In these
cases the law does not fully describe the act. It simply sets
before a man a certain result and commands or forbids him
to bring about that result. Thus it is held that any act which
has a direct tendency to cause a breach of the peace, and
any act which has a tendency to obstruct or corrupt the administration of justice, and any act endangering the safety,
health or comfort of the community, is a misdemeanor at
common law.
The comprehensiveness and adaptability of the criminal
law depend upon this method of prohibition. By declaring that any act which has a direct tendency to cause a
breach of the peace, etc., is a crime it provides a method
of punishing every act which has this consequence with49See Mlay, Crim. L., p.

7.
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out requiring a new definition for every new wrong of this
class which the ingenuity of offenders might devise.

Locality of an Act
It is a general principle that crimes are strictly local in
character, and are to be punished only by the state in whose
territory they are committed and in accordance with its
laws. "The locus delicti furnishes not only the law by which
a crime is to be punished but also the jurisdiction to
punish it." 50
It is therefore important to determine the place in which
an act is done. In the majority of cases this inquiry presents no difficulty, but there are two classes of cases which
require special consideration:
(I ) Where an act is done partly in one place and partly
in another.
(2) Where the act is a negative act.
Where an act is committed partly in one place and
partly in another, the crime as a whole is perpetrated in
neither, and the question is presented whether either or
both or neither is the place of the crime. The possible answers to this question are:
(1) That the act is committed in neither place.
(2) That it is committed solely in the place in which
it had its commencement.
(3) That it is committed solely in the place in which
it is completed.
(4) That it is committed in both places.
The theory that the act is done in neither place, which
as a matter of strict logic seems to be the correct one, seems
to be supported by those authorities which hold that if a
person is wounded in one county and dies in another, or is
wounded in one state or country and dies in another, the
killer cannot be convicted of homicide in either.r'
An examination of the older authorities which are cited

50Minor, Conflict of Laws, p. 498.
51Clark and Marshall, Crimes, p. 765.

DIcEiNsON LAW REVlEW

for these doctrines discloses that they were not based upon
any theory about the place where the crime ought to be considered to be committed, but upon purely processual
grounds which have long since become obsolete.
In ancient times the jury was not a body of triers merely,
who decided the issue on evidence adduced by the parties,
but was a body of men called to decide from their own personal knowledge of the facts in issue. It was, therefore,
necessary that the jurors should be called from the vicinity
where the facts in issue occurred, and it was considered that
where a wound was inflicted in one county or country and
death occurred in another, the homicide could not be prosecuted in either, for it was supposed that a jury of the first
place could not inquire into the death, and a jury of the
5
second plac could not inquire into the wounding. 2
In later times the function of the jury was changed.
They were no longer required or allowed to decide from
their own knowledge but only on the evidence; and the
theory that a jury could not inquire about events which occurred elsewhere was discarded, and is not now the law
anywhere.
It follows that the older authorities under* discussion,
and the more recent decisions so far as they merely follow
these older authorities, do not support the theory that an
act committed partly in one place and partly in another cannot be punished in either.53 Indeed it has been truly said
"no such theory is allowable in law; for so long as distinct
territorial areas of jurisdiction are recognized, the law must
assume that it is possible to determine with respect to every
act the particular area in which it is committed.""
The theory that an act is done in the place in which it
has its commencement prevails in Germany, but seems not
to be generally adopted in the United States. "It seems
5

S2Clark and Marshall, Crimes, p. 765.
Terry, Principles of Anglo-American Law, p. 600.
54
Salmond, Jurisprudence, p. 330.
53
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quite certain," says Terry, "that the place where the act
in the strict sense is done is not as such the place of the

wrong.55 In accordance with this view it is held that if a
person in one state or country does an act which takes effect and causes the death of another person in another state
or country, he cannot be punished in the former state or
country.56

It has been declared, however, that "when the legal
definition of a crime is satisfied by the performance of an
act in such a manner that its proximate consequences may
occur, whether or not they do occur the crime is complete
where the act is committed, and that place, therefore, is the
place of crime," 57 which is merely another way of saying
that in case of acts which are made criminal because of their
anticipation as distinguished from their actual consequences,
the acts are to be considered as committed in the place in
which they have their commencement.
The theory that an act is committed in the place where
it is completed is said to be that "adopted for most purposes. ' 58

"The general principle is that if it [the criminal

act] is committed partly in one state and partly in another,
the locality of the offense is not where it is begun but where
it is completed." 5 0
For example, it is held that the offense of obtaining
goods by false pretences is committed in the place where
the goods are obtained and not in the place where the pretences are made; 6 0 and conspiracy is not committed in the
place where the criminal proposition originates but in the
place where it is accepted. 01
5
- Principles of Anglo-American Law, p. 600.
56S. v. Hall, 114 N. C. 909, 19 S. E. 602; U.

Cas. No. 14, 932.
57IRjbinson, Elementary L. sec. 580.
5SSalmond, Jurisprudence, p. 330.
5STiernan, Conflict of Laws, sec. 38.
6016 C. J. 162.
6ITicrnan, Conflict of Laws, p. 103.

S. v.

Davis; Fed.
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This theory is adopted in those cases in which acts are
made criminal because of their actual as distinguished from
their anticipated consequences. In such cases the crime is
not committed until the consequences have been produced,
and the place in which they are produced is the locality of
6 2
the crime.
For example, it is held that the offense of maintaining
a nuisance is committed in every jurisdiction in which the
act takes effect;63 and where a person in one state does an
act which takes effect and causes death in another, the homicide is committed in the latter ;64 and if a person while in one
state shoots at but misses a person in another, he is guilty
of an assault in the latter state, provided the bullet reaches
65
the territory of the latter state.

The cases which hold that where death occurs in one
state from injuries inflicted in another state, the offender cannot be punished in the former state are in conflict
with this theory.6 6 An attempt has been made to reconcile
these cases with the theory under discussion by saying that
death is not a part of the crime of homicide,67 but this is
clearly incorrect. "s
The theory that the act may be considered as done in
either the place where it has its commencement or the place
where it is completed, with slight modifications, has been
suggested as the proper one,6 9 and it has been said that the
modern tendency is to permit criminal proceedings to be in62Robinson, Elementary Law, see. 580.
63S. v. Lord, 16 N. H. 357.
64U. S. v. Davis, Fed. Cas. 14, 932.
65
Simpson v. S., 92 Ga. 41; 17 S. E. 984.
66C. v. Apkins, 148 Ky. 207; 39 L. N. S. 822; 16 C. J. 166.
67Green v. S., 66 Ala. 40.
68
1n many States statutes expressly provide that the crime may
be punished if the death occurs there altho the blow was given in another State, and these statutes have been sustained as constitutional. C. v. Macloon, 101 Mass. 1; Hunter v. S., 40 N. J. L. 495.
69
Terry, Anglo-American L., p. 606.
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stituted either in the locality where the criminal act is com0
menced or where it is continued, or where it is completed.7
This tendency has found expression in statutes making amenable to the criminal law of the state a person who in whole
or in part commits a crime therein.71
A second class of cases in which the determination of
the locality of an act gives rise to difficulty is that of negative acts. The proper theory is said to be that a negative
act is located in the place where the corresponding positive
act ought to have been performed. "The presence of a
negative act is the absence of a corresponding positive act,
and the positive act is absent from the place in which it
''
ought to be present. 72
It is accordingly held that a person may be convicted of
embezzlement of his employer's money in the jurisdiction
in which he failed or refused to account for it as it was his
duty to do, although he may not have disposed of or ex3
pended the money in such jurisdiction.7
Time of an Act
The determination of time at which an act is committed
involves difficulties similar to those to which a determination
of its place gives rise. An act which begins today and is
finished tomorrow is in fact done neither today or tomorrow, but in that space of time which includes both. For
most purposes, however, the law regards the date of its completion as the date of the act. 74 Thus homicide is regarded
as committed on the day of the death and not on the day of
70Robinson, Elementary L.

sec. 580.

7"See P. v. Botkin, 9 Cal. A. 244; 98 Pac. 861.
72Salmond, Jurisprudence, p. 331.
73S. v. Bailey, 50 Ohio State 636; 36 N.
74Salmond, Jurisprudence, p. 331.

E. 233.

234
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the wounding;?5 and false pretences on the day the property
is obtained and not on the day the pretences are made.71
Acts Constituting Different Crimes
Acts which are similar in some respects may constitute
different crimes:
(I) Because they are different in other
respects; (2) because they are accompanied by a different
mental element; (3) because they are prohibited by different systems of law.
Acts which are similar in their origin may constitute different crimes because they differ in their circumstances.
Thus shooting at a person in a private room is an assault;
in a public place, a breach of the peace; in the presence of
a court, a contempt.
Acts which are similar in their origin and circumstances
may constitute different crimes because their consequences
differ. Thus an unlawful blow struck at another may fail
to reach him and constitute an assault; or reach him and
constitute a battery; or destroy a limb and constitute mayhem; or cause death and constitute homicide.
Acts which are in all respects similar may constitute
different crimes because of a difference in the mental element with which they are accompanied. This difference
may be either in the intent or in the motive. Every act may
give rise to two questions with respect to the mental attitude
of the actor. The first is: How did he do the act, intentionally or not? The second is: If he did it intentionally
why did he do it? The purpose of the actor to do the act
is the intent and his purpose in doing it is his motive.
The act of hitting one on the head with an ax and killing him is murder in the first degree if the actor intended to
kill, but is only murder in the second degree if the actor intended merely to inflict great bodily harm. The difference
in the intent renders the acts different crimes.
The act of breaking and entering a dwelling house in
7iReynolds v. S., 1 Ga. 222; for estimating period
tion.
76S. v. Gerhardt, 248 Mo. 535; 15 S. W. 722.
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the night time is burglary if the reason for doing it was the
desire to commit a felony, but is at most a misdemeanor if
the reason was something else. The difference in the motives renders the acts different crimes.
Acts which are similar may constitute different crimes
because they are prohibited by different systems of law. In
the United States an act may be prohibited by: (I) federal law; (2) state law, and (3) municipal ordinance and
be punished as a crime by the nation, the state and the
municipality, and an act so prohibited constitutes different
crimes even tho all three laws designate it by the same
name.T
HARRISON HITCHLER.
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WILSON vs. MRS. FRAME
Sci Fa on Mortgage-Wife Securing Husband's Loan-Married
Woman's Property Acts
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mrs. Frame, wife of John Frame, made a mortgage for $2,500. on her land, as security for a loan then made to the husband, on his note to Wilson. The note not being paid, this is a
sci fa sur the mortgage.
Beck for the Plaintiff.
Bishop for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Crunkleton, J.-Under the old Roman law and English common law, the husband and wife were considered as one person.
The legal existence of the wife was merged in that of the husband.
She could not make a valid contract, convey or purchase property
in her own name. Such was the early common law in Pennsylvania. Later the married person's property acts of 1770, 1812,
1848,. 1847, 1887 and 1893 were passed extending the married
woman's power to contract, sell and convey property, until at the
present time the right to contract and transact all kinds of business is general and her disabilities are the exception.
By sections 1 and 2 of the act of June 8, 1893, P. L. 244,
the rights and powers of a married woman are defined as follows: See. 1 states, "Hereafter a married woman shall have the
same rights and powers as an unmarried person to acquire, own,
possess, control, use, lease, sell or otherwise dispose of any property of any kind, real, personal or mixed, and in either in possession or expectancy, and may exercise the said right and power
in the same manner and to the same extent as an unmarried person, but she may not mortgage or convey her property, unless her
husband joins in such conveyance."
Sec. 2 states that, "Hereafter a married woman may, in the
same manner and to the same extent as an unmarried person,
make any contract in writing or otherwise, which is necessary, appropriate, convenient or advaintageous to the exercise or enjoyment of the rights and powers granted by the foregoing section,
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but she may not become an accommodation endorser, maker, guarantor or surety for another, and she may not execute or acknowledge a deed or written instrument, conveying or mortgaging her
real property, unless her husband joins such mortgage or
conveyance."
Thus we see that every restriction imposed at common law,
upon the capacity of a married woman to contract has been removed except in two cases: (1) She cannot become an accommodation indorser or maker, or guarantor or surety for another;
and (2) she cannot, unless her husband joins, convey or mortgage
her real estate. Under the common law she has no power at all
to contract but at the present time she has certain powers given
by the statutes which must be strictly followed. Peter Adams
Paper Co. vs. Cassard, 206 Pa. 179.
Under sections 1 and 2 of the act of June 8, 1893, a married
woman's right to contract, lease and use her property is general
and her disability is the exception. The right to mortgage or become a guarantor are the exceptions specifically laid down by the
legislature, and in order to execute a valid mortgage on her real
property a married woman's husband must join in the mortgage.
In the case at bar the mortgage given by Mrs. Frame was to
secure the debt of her husband to Wilson. The mortgage was not
on Mrs. Frame's personal property but on real estate -held by her.
The debt not being paid Wilson causes a sci fa sur mortgage to be
issued. Not only did -the defendant's husband not join in the
mortgage, as required by sections 1 and 2 of the act above, but
the mortgage was executed to secure the debt of the husband to
Wilson. The mortgage was in fact given to secure or guarantee
the husband's debt; and the court will look through all the disguises where the facts show an intention to evade the restrictions
on the contractual capacity of a married woman as set forth by
the act of June 8, 1893, supra, Kempler vs. Richardson, 72 Sup.
115.
The first part of sections 1 and 2 of the act referred to above
give a married woman large contractual rights and powers and the
latter part of these sections were intended as a restriction against
a too liberal interpretation of the preceding grant of rights and
powers. The act was so interpreted in Kuhn vs. Ogilie, 178 Pa.
303. In Bartholeamew vs. Allentown Bank, 260 Pa. 509, in which
the act was interpreted, it was held that, "A married woman may
do anything in a contractual way except that she may not mortgage or convey her real property, unless her husband join in such
mortgage or conveyance, and may not become an accommodation
endorser, maker, guarantor or surety for another.
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The rule as to when a married woman is to be considered a
surety has been very well stated in 21 Cyc. 1465 as follows: "To
the extent that the consideration was received by her husband or
any other person or that it went to pay a debt or liability for
which neither she nor her property was bound, it will be held a
contract of suretyship. Whether she was surety or principle will
be determined not from -the form of contract, nor from the basis
upon which the transaction was had, but from the inquiry was the
wife to receive, either in person or in benefit to her estate, or did
she so receive, the consideration upon which the contract rests."
By strict interpretation of -he act of 1893 the court is of
opinion that Mrs. Frame was a surety within the strict prohibition
of the statute and whereas she has executed a mortgage on her
real estate without the joinder of her husband, which is also prohibited by this statute, (supra.), therefore judgment is entered for
the defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The learned court below finds two objections to the enforcement of the mortgage. (a) It was made by the wife for the loan
to the husband, thus virtually being a guaranty or suretyship for
him; and (b) It is not executed along with the husband.
The second objection is valid. The act of 1793 (3 Stewart's
Purdon 2453) prescribes that a married wonan "may not execute
or acknowledge a deed or written instrument conveying or mortgaging her real property, unless her husband join in such mortgage or conveyance." The joinder of the husband expresses his
assent to the mortgage. He doubtless expressed plainly enough
his assent to this mortgage, which was made to secure a loan to
him, but we suppose the letter of the statute must be observed.
But the first objection is invalid. Long before the act of
1893, the power of a married woman to mortgage or pledge her
real or personal property for her husband, or indeed anybody,
was recognized. Haffey vs. Carey, 73 Pa. 431. Kuhn vs. Ogilvie, 178 Pa. 303. Righter vs. Livingstone, 214 Pa. 28. It has
not been taken away by the prohibition of her becoming guarantor or surety. A distinction is made between pledging any property, present, or future, and pledging specific property, real or
personal. It seems foolish to make this distinction, but the law
does not always seem wise.
The judgment of the learned court below is
AFFIRMED.
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MOSLEY vs. KISTLER
Distress-Procedure--Appraisement-Act of March 21, 1772
(2 Purdon 2177)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Kistler rented a farm to Mosley for $800 per annum, payable half yearly. The rent for the first six months not being paid,
Kistler distrained the goods on the premises, and on the fifth day
after the day of distress caused an appraisement to be nade.
Ten days after the appraisement the goods were sold. Mosley
then sued in trespass and proved that the value of the goods at
the time of the sale was $350, although at the sale the goods
brought only $250.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Petersen, J.-In
rendering a judgment upon these facts it
will be necessary to consider the act of March 21, 1772. (2 Purdon 2177) which provides as follows: Where any goods or chattels shall be distrained for any rent reserved and due upon any
demise, lease or contract whatsoever and the tenant or owner of
the goods so distrained, shall not, within five days next after such
distress taken, and notice thereof with cause of such taking, left
at the mansion house or other such notorious place on the premises, charged with rent distrained for, replevy the same, with sufficient security given to the sheriff according to law, then and in
such case, after such distress and notice aforesaid, and expiration
of five days, the person distraining shall and may, with the sheriff
under-sheriff, or any constable in city or county, where such distress shall be taken cause the goods and chattels so distrained to
be appraised.
Quoting from the opinion of Judge Williams in 128 Pa. 100
he says, "The act of 1772 was framed upon the statute of 2 W. &
M. and the landlord was left under the necessity of strict compliance of its provisions, or being held a trespasser ab initio
and liable for the full value of the goods seized and sold. A sale
made under such circumstances, not being under the protection
of the statute is unauthorized and void. 30 Pa. 287-14 S. & R.
399; 60 Pa. 452." In the latter case Sharswood, J., says: "When
it is once settled that the day of distress is to be excluded in the
computation of time, the act -of assembly determines the rest.
The appraiqemenrt cannot be made on the fifth or last day. The
words of the act are not open to question or doubt, it is not to be
made until the expiration of five days."
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The act of June 20, 1883, which regflates the computation of
time under statutes specifically states that in computing time under statutes the first day is to be excluded and the last day
included.
In this case the appraisement was made on the fifth day after
the distraint. This was a clear violation of the statute. This
position is sustained by a long line of decisions in the commonwealth of Pennsylvania. In Davis vs. Davis, 128 Pa. 100, it was
held as follows: In computing the five days which must elapse
before the appraisement, the day of seizure is excluded and if the
fifth day thereafter fall on a Sunday, it is also excluded;wherefor
if goods are distrained on a Tuesday an appraisement cannot be
properly made before the succeeding Tuesday. If the appraisement of goods made for the distraint of rent is nmade before the
expiration of five days after seizure be followed by a sale the distrainor is not protected by statute but becomes a trespasser ab
initio, and is liable to the owner of the goods for their full
value.
Here there was a premature appraisement which was followed
by a sale. If the sale had not taken place the landlord would not
have been guilty of a trespass, 3 Binney 406. However, by proceeding to sell he rendered himself open to an action by the
plaintiff, 60 Pa. 452. The act of 1883 did not change the law in
any respect it only confirmed by statute what had already been
fixed by decisions for over fifty years.
The plaintiff proved that the value of the goods distrained in
an unlawffil manner was $350. The amount that they brought
was only $250. In recommending this case for a new trial we
urge the learned court below to take this into account.
This rule may seem harsh, and works a hardship on -the landlord. However, we must follow the decisions of the commonwealth, which demand that a new trial be granted. Judgment
accordingly.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The act of 1772 is the authority for making a sale of goods
which have been distrained by a landlord for rent. Five full days
must intervene between the notice to the tenant of the distress,
and the making of the appraisement. The appraisement must not
be made before the sixth day following that on which the notice
of the levy is made. Landlord and Tenant, p. 234. The sale is
to take place not before the sixth day after the day on which the
appraisement is made.
It has been held that even if the space of time between the
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distress and the sale is that prescrihd, viz, 12 days, it will be unauthorized if this space is not properly apportioned, between the
levy and the appraisement, and the appraisement end the sale.
In Davis vs. Davis, 128 Pa. 100, the appraisement was made
on Monday, when it should have been made on Tuesday, but the
sale did not take place until the eighth day thereafter. More than
the necessary time had elapsed since the making of the distress,
yet the sale was held to be unlawful. Cf. Ehrhart vs. Esbenshade,
233 Pa. 18, and Quinn vs. Swartley, 240 Pa. 585.
If the sale is unlawful, the landlord is a trespasser in making it ab initio, and is liable for the value of the goods, despite
the indebtedness for rent of the tenant. A huge injustice was
done in Davis vs. Davis, supra. The arrears of a widow's dower
amounted to $4,546.44. A distress was made on goods of the tenant
and a sale nade which produced $3,380. The trial court allowed
a verdict of $5,524.26 to be recovered from the widow. Her offense was that she had not properly divided the interval between
levy and sale. The regret expressed by the writer of the opinion
reveals a preposterous state of mind. "Its result," it says, "is a
great hardship." "There is no suggestion of actual injury resulting from the appraisement on Monday, instead of Tuesday. None
could have resulted as far as we are -able to see." And then the
blame is put on the legislature.
Yet the act says nothing which could lead to such an abhorrent conclusion. Nothing in it obliges us to say -that an unimportant departure from the prescribed method of procedure, shall
make the landlord liable as a trespasser for the value of the goods
sold. What is needed is not so much new legislation, as a little rationality in the interpretation of the old.
The conclusion reached by the learned court below must be
sustained.
AFFIRMED.

WATER CO. vs. R. R. CO.
Eminent Domain-Right of R. R. Co. to Take Land Already
Appropriated for Public Purpose-Necessity for Land

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff, furnishing water to a city, had acquired a tract of
land through which a stream ran, the water from which it was using to supply the inhabitants of a city. The R. R. intending to
straighten its road, was proceeding to take a strip of the plain-
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tiff's land which was not immediately close to the stream, and the
appropriation of which would not interfere with the plaintiff in
supplying water. The plaintiff has filed a bill to restrain the R.
R. from proceeding with the effort to appropriate. Plaintiff contends that the fact that the premises were already appropriated
by a public service corporation prevented the appropriation of it
by another corporation. The court rejected this contention, but
held that if the R. R. appropriation would not interfere with the
operation of the water company, such appropriation was
permissable.
Bachman for the Plaintiff.
L. Morgan for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
KANTNER, J. The plaintiff in this case is attempting to prevent by injunction the taking of certain of its land by the defendant in pursuance of the defendant's right of ,eminent domain.
Both parties are public service corporations under the definition
of that term contained in the Public Service Companies Law of
1913, P. L. 1374, and this case presents for our consideration the
interesting question of the right of one public service corporation
to condemn for its own use property belonging to another public
service corporation but which is not actually used by the latter in
its service of the public. The plaintiff is not merely dissatisfied
with the compensation offered for its land, but denies the right of
the defendant to -take its land at all, even though it may be of no
use to the present owner.
The prevailing rule is that the right of eminent domain is an
attribute of sovereignty, inherent therein as a necessary and inseparable part thereof, and which may be exercised either directly by the state through its legislature, or which may be delegated
by the legislature to either corporate bodies or individual enterprises, subject to the limitations imposed in the constitution. The
right is one which lies dormant in the etate uiltil legislative action
points out the occasion, mode, conditions, and agencies for its
exercise.
The statutory authority under which the defendant is proceeding is contained in the act of March 17, 1869, P. L. 12, relating to the straightening and widening of railroads and canals, the
text of which in so far as it is relevant to the issue at bar, is as
follows:
"It shall and may be lawful for any railroad-to straighten,
widen, or btherwise improve the whole or portions of its lines,
whenever, in the opinion of the board of directors of any such

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

243

company, -the same may be necessary for the better securing the
safety of persons and property, and increasing the facilities and
capacity for transportation of traffic thereon, and for such purpose to purchase, hold and use, or enter upon, take, and appropriate land and material, provided-they shall make ample compensation to the owner or owners thereof."
It will be observed that the act expressly commits to the
board of directors of the railroad company the determination of
the question of the necessity of condemning additional land for
the purpose of straightening its line, and a determination by the
board that the proposed change is necessary for the purposes indicated in the act is conclusive, and if such determination is reached
in good faith the court has no supervisory power over it.
The
mere fact that the controlling power of the railroad authorized
the undertaking of alterations in the -tracks which will place a
considerable financial burden upon the company and expose it to
an expensive piece of litigation clearly shows that they consider
the proposed alterations a necessity. Nor will the court inquire
as to whether or not an equally suitable route might be laid out
which would not encroach on the land of the water company, the
selection of the particular location being a matter to be determined wholly by the party exercising the power of eminent
domain.
The mere fact that the land which the defendant is seeking
to condemn had previously been acquired by a public service corporation will not preclude the taking of the same land for another
and different use. The power of eminent domain is not exhausted
by use, and can only be limited by the public exigency upon which
it is founded. The power may be exercised in favor of public
uses over any and all property, private or even public, and the
property of corporations as well as that of individuals; and where
property has previously been dedicated to public use it may still
be taken for another and different public use, and this the more
readily when the property so previously dedicated to a public use
has not actually been used for such purpose, or is not essential to
the business of the owner in the service of the public.
That such is the rule is clearly laid down in the case of the
Scranton Gas and Water Co. vs. Delaware, Lackawanna and
Western R. R. Co., 225 Pa. 152. This is -a case in all respects
parallel to the present one, being a bill in equity to restrain the
defendant company from condemning land of the plaintiff for the
purpose of relocating its tracks. The D. L. & W. R. R. Co. had
located its tracks on the southeastern side of a stream, the water
from which the plaintiff was using to supply the city of Scranton,
and was proceeding to relocate its tracks on the northwestern
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side of the same stream and passing through the site of a proposed
reservoir, but shortening the track nearly half a mile. The court
found that such change would cause no substantial injury to the
present or future use of the land as a source of water supply, and
accordingly dismissed the bill for an injunction.
That such a rule is the only one consistent with the best interests of the public seems to be beyond dispute, as to hold otherwise would mean that whenever land was acquired by a public
service corporation it would immediately become an obstacle to
progress, as the company could hold such land without making
any use of the same regardless of the inconvenience thereby resulting to the public.
Accordingly the decree of the trial court dismissing the bill is
AFFIRMED.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
Further discussion of the question involved is unnecessary.
The judgment of the learned court below is
AFFIRMED.

BRANDON vs. DUNHAM
Contracts-Award by Arbitrators-Expert

Testimony

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Dunham contracted with Brandon to erect a house for him.
It was agreed that X, the architect, should have supervision of
the work and that materials and workmanship should be satisfactory to him; otherwise Brandon should abandon the construction
and accept such compensation for work done as should be decided to be just by three arbitrators, of whom one should be selected by each of the parties, and the third by the other two. At
an early stage of the work X declared himself dissatisfied with the
kind of material used and the quality of the work. Dunham required Brandon to stop performance of the contract. Brandon
alleging want of justification for this, sues for damages. He calls
three architects, who say that they would have pronounced the
work satisfactory. Verdict for $12,000 damages. Motion for a
new trial.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Lewis, J.-The terms of the contract make it plainly evident
that the decision of X, the architect, as to the quality of the workmanship and material, should be final. Both parties agreed that
if X should become dissatisfied the plaintiff should abandon the
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construction. We fail to find any breach on the part of the defendant as he did not require the plaintiff to stop work until X had
notified him that he was dissatisfied. The defendant's action in
this regard was merely a strict observance of the contract in pursuing a remedy therein providedd.
The plaintiff in contending that the decision of the architect
was not final and that it was proper to raise the question before
the jury of the quality of material and workmanship, relies on the
case of Dobbling vs. York Springs Rwy. Co., 203 Pa. 628, and 207
Pa. 123. However, the court is of the opinion that the law therein laid down is not applicable because the defendant in the case
at bar acted entirely within the power which the contract vested
in him and hence the only question left for determination is the
amount due the plaintiff for work and material already expended.
The case cited plainly makes a distinction between actions which
have been instituted merely for rescission and those for work already done. It must also be noted in Dobbling vs. York Springs
Rwy. Co., that the recission of the contract was due to matters
entirely foreign to any stipulation in it regarding a reference of
them to -an architect or engineer.
It is also argued on the part of the plaintiff that the testimony of the three architects was admissable to impeach the good
faith of X, the supervising architect. The court fails to discern
why a variance of opinion regarding a fact is any evidence of bad
faith on the part of the parties concerned. Bad faith or collusion
on the part of the architect is always a relevant inquiry but
in the absence of such the decision of the architect is conclusive,
214 Pa. 569. Even though there is bad faith on the part of the
architect, the injured party's remedy is against the architect at
fault and not the owner. Payne vs. Roberts, 214 Pa. 569; Reynolds vs. Caldwell, 51 Pa. 298.
The arbitration clause of the contract has no bearing on any
question touching the work or materials; by express provisions
they were to be satisfactory to X, the architect. Payne vs. Roberts, 214 Pa. 568. Providing this action were for compensation
for work and materials expended the plaintiff could revoke the
clause regarding arbitration. Yost vs. Insurance Co., 179 Pa.
381; McCune vs. Lytle, 197 Pa. 381. However, when he submitted
his case to court for settlement, subject matter, which, by the
terms of the contract, had been left to the decision of the architect, could not be brought into the controversy as the contract
plainly ousted the court's jurisdiction. The court should only
have taken cognizance of the matter which had been set aside
for arbitration, viz, compensation for the work and material al-
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ready expended. 214 Pa. 568; 203 Pa. 628. 31 Pa. 306.
It is evident from what has been said that the court
erred in admitting the testimony of the three architects regarding
a question which was conclusively provided for in the contract.
The motion for a new trial is iranted.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The able opinion of the learned court below makes unnecessary a protracted discussion by us of the points involved. The
judgment is therefore
AFFIRMED.
COMMONWEALTH vs. HENDRICKS, ET. AL.
Conspracy-Fraud-Fire Insurance-Evidence
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants are charged with conspiring to set fire to a building, in order to defraud an insurance company. To show that
Hendricks had an interest in the building and the policy of insurance, a copy of a contract to convey the property to X and of an
assignment of this contract to Hendricks was offered by the prosecution. No demand had been made on Hendricks to produce the
original but it was shown that he was in possession of it. Conviction. Error assigned, that copy was not admissible without first
notifying Hendricks to produce the original.
Delesantro for the Plaintiff.
Douglass for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
Dively, J.-The general rule relative to the introduction of
secondary evidence of the contents of written instrument, is that
prior notice must have been given to the holder of the original.
This rule as applied to civil cases, tends strongly to promote justice to both plaintiff and defendant, but it was early realized that
its application in criminal prosecutions often conflicted with other
rules of law. To overcome this, the court branded it with exceptions. Whether an exception was proper in the case at bar was a
much mooted question prior to 1916 ,in fact, the data in some instances supported the theory that the general rule was applicable;
however, in Commonwealth vs. Hubbard, 65 Superior Ct. 213, the
question is definitely settled that on the trial of a prosecution for
conspiracy to cheat and defraud an insurance company by the
burning of a building, secondary evidence of the contents of a
paper needed in evidence by the Commonwealth is admissible with-
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out proof of notice to produce where it appears that the original

is in the possession of the defendant. This rule carefully guards
the rights of the defendant, for if notice were required, the prosecuting officer, in the presence of the jury, would have the right to
demand the production of the original writing. The accused
would then have an election, to produce the document, explain its
non-production, or remain silent. His election of any is likely to
be highly prejudicial to his case before the jury. His constitutional rights under both Federal and State clauses are guarded,
whereas the reverse rule would obviously violate his rights under
either. Immunity from testifying is carefully safeguarded by this
rule. Even his silent action under rule contended for by defense
would place him in a position before the jury where his action
would be more incriminating than giving evidence against himself. This result should be avoided and same is avoided by the rule
above stated. McKnight vs. U. S., 115 C. C. 972.
What is the purpose of prior notice? To enable the adverse
party to have the document in court. It is not given to enable the
party notified to explain, nullify or confirm it. Even under the
firm rule in civil cases an exception is permitted when it is shown
that the document is in the possession of the defendant in court;
notice may be there given to produce it and in the event of his refusal, the opposite party may give secondary evidence of its contents. If the secondary evidence does not agree with the original,
the defendant has power to correct it. It would seem, therefore,
that the purpose of giving notice is fully satisfied in a criminal
case where the possession of the original has been traced to the
defendant.
The assignments of error have been carefully considered. In
the court's opinion they are without foundation and insufficient to
warrant reversal of the learned court below. The conviction is
accordingly sustained and affirmed.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
Generally a party cannot give secondary evidence of a writing, unless, being in the possession of an opposite party, he fails,
on notice, to produce it.
But what may the notice be? Sometimes the nature of a
prosecution, in a criminal case, indicates to the accused that the
Comnonwealth will need -to prove the execution and contents of
a writing which is in the possession of the defendant. This necessity, under which the state is, is sufficient notice to the defendant to have the writing in court.
In U. S. vs. Doebler, Baldw. 519, Wigmore's Cases on Evi-
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dence, p. 471, a case of passing forged bank notes, the defendant
was advised by the nature of the prosecution -that the U. S. would
need to prove scienter, and that for this purpose, it would probably need to show the possession of other forged notes. This was
sufficient notice to the defendant to have -these other forged notes
in court, and to justify secondary evidence of them, if they were
not produced.
A somewhat similar case is this before us. Hendricks is
charged with a conspiracy to burn e building in order to defraud
an insurance company. He must have had a motive. His ownership of the building could be a motive. If owner, he was made such
by some contract, deed, etc. To prove the execution and contents
of such contract, deed, etc., would be one of the tasks of the
prosecution. The defendant's knowledge of this would be notice
for him to have the document in court, in order to respond to the
Commonwealth's demand for it, or -to render its use of secondary
evidence permissible. Hence, at the trial, if the documents were
not produced by the defendant, although no demand had been
made on hin for them, the Commonwealth could prove that there
had been such documents, and that their contents were such and
such. Commonwealth vs. Hubbard, 65 Supr. 213.
It follows that the decision of the learned court below must
be
AFFIRMED.

